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Abstract 
Corruption and poverty have long been linked with each other, but recent studies, 
such as the Corruption Perceptions Index and Standard & Poor's Corporate 
Governance Scores, have since strengthened this correlation. Even though 
progress has been made in establishing anti-corruption laws and regulations, the 
results of these studies reveal that much more needs to be accomplished before we 
see meaningful improvements in the world's poorest countries. In this research, we 
will focus on one country in particular, Guatemala. By examining the effect that 
culture, history, and politics have on Guatemala's corporate governance and 
financial environment, we will see the steps that need to be taken to lead 
Guatemala on the road to financial transparency. 
 
 Guatemala has endured a long, violent path in its political history, from its 
beginnings in military authoritarian rule to its current status of electoral democracy. No 
doubt this turbulent political environment has influenced the wave of corruption and 
poverty that has been and still is occurring in Guatemala today. According to the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (2006), most countries in the world face serious perceived 
levels of domestic corruption1, with Guatemala perceiving its corruption level as being 
"rampant." This level of corruption certainly impairs its corporate governance structure, 
which in turn impairs the ability for Guatemala to achieve financial transparency.  
What does this mean for the Guatemalan economy? As stated in Standard & 
Poor's Corporate Governance Report (2003), evidence is growing to support the fact 
that corporate governance and financial performance are inextricably linked. Investors 
cite governance practices being as important as financial performance in evaluating 
investment opportunities and are willing to pay a premium for shares of a well-
governed company. Consequently, the rampant corruption and weak corporate 
governance within Guatemala have discouraged investors from engaging in business 
either with or within the country. This vicious circle of corruption and poverty has made 
it extremely difficult for Guatemala to make any headway in improving its economic 
position. 
This research will attempt to link Guatemala's political history and culture with 
its corporate governance structure and financial environment. The subject of the first 
part will be an introduction and historical analysis of Guatemala's politics and culture. 
We will then examine transparency and corruption, and how these two qualities, or lack 
thereof, can affect a country's ability to achieve success in domestic and world 
economies. We will evaluate Guatemala's corporate governance according to Standard 
& Poor's Corporate Governance Scores. These scores should highlight improvements 
Guatemala needs to make, as well as the steps Guatemala is taking in the right direction. 
Finally we conclude by looking at the relationship between Guatemala’s corporate 
Governance environment and investment by US based companies. 
                                                 
1 Even though progress has been made in establishing anti-corruption laws and regulations, the 2006 CPI 
results show that much more needs to be done in order to truly improve the world's poorest countries. 
 
I: Understanding Guatemala 
Guatemala is the largest and most populous of the Central American countries2, 
but is quite unlike the rest of Central America because of its large, unintegrated 
indigenous population. During the first millennium A.D., the Mayan civilization 
flourished in Guatemala and in the surrounding regions for almost three centuries, when 
in 1821 it won its independence from Spain. A variety of military and civilian 
governments took control over Guatemala during the second half of the 20th century, 
including Liberals, Dictators, and Communists. During the period of liberal-democratic 
control, several major reforms were implemented, which ultimately shaped and led to 
Guatemala’s current social and political problems (Booth, et al, 2006).  
The rapid economic change and repression that ensued drove turmoil and regime 
change, resulting in a 36-year guerrilla war that ended in 1996. The government signed 
a peace agreement formally ending the conflict, which had left more than 200,000 
people dead and created some 1 million refugees (The World Factbook, 2006). This 
prolonged civil war saw the emergence of three separate regimes, ultimately resulting in 
a democracy that not only reduced the power and influence of the military, but also 
allowed former rebels to attain significant political positions.  
According to Booth (2006), the fledgling regime faced many obstacles, 
including the potential that those rebel groups and other violent protestors opposed to 
democracy and the necessary socioeconomic reforms would undermine any progress. 
This proved true when a series of assassinations and murders of highly ranked officials 
took place, eventually leading to the conviction of several military officers. In addition, 
the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) released a report in 1999 which blamed 
the army and state security forces for 93 percent of the acts of violence which were 
committed during the war. The report also found that the atrocities were on par with 
genocide, with those of Mayan ethnicity making up eighty-three percent of the victims 
(Sanford, 2003).  
Despite the evidence presented by the CEH, then president, Álvaro Enrique 
Arzú Yrigoyen downplayed many of the military’s actions and their impacts, as well as 
rejected the commission’s recommendation to form a separate authority to further 
investigate these incidents and remove the military personnel responsible. Later that 
year, constituents voted against a referendum outlining constitutional reforms to include 
military and judicial improvements, further diminishing any chance at a peace 
agreement (Sanford, 2003). 
The elections in 1999 focused on growing social violence and socioeconomic 
woes. According to Booth (2006), changes which called for improving the status of 
those in poverty, i.e. a minimum wage increase, caused a continuous rift between the 
Guatemalan government and the business community. The ruling government did 
manage to take small steps toward improvement, only to be set back by its failure to 
control increasing crime or to make any advancement in peace accords.  In addition, the 
United States Congress (2002) stated that appointed corrupt officials not only 
undermined the government’s credibility, but also prevented any socioeconomic 
progression. Although military influence had been significantly reduced, these corrupt 
                                                 
2 Guatemala has a GDP per capita of $4,900, roughly one-half that of Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. 
Guatemala’s population is approximately 12,728,111, ranking 69th in the world, according to the U.S. 
Census Bureau (July, 2007).  
 
politicians increased the military budget and duties and placed in positions of command 
former army officers linked to organized crime and human rights abuses.  
During the most recent elections in 2004, voters elected Oscar Berger, a 
candidate who had campaigned promising the creation of jobs and support for the peace 
accords. He vowed to fix rampant military problems through reducing the size of the 
military as well as the budget.3 He also replaced corrupt senior military officials and 
pledged to compensate the victims of the war.  He went so far as to issue an apology for 
the atrocities. To address the problem of increasing gang and criminal activity, Berger 
joined forces with the governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua in signing 
an agreement that would allow warrants issued in one country to be served in all of the 
four signatory countries (Daniel, 2004). Although human rights abuses have declined, 
Berger has had much more trouble addressing the problem. To date, political activists 
and workers continue to be viable targets of violent repression. In addition, Berger has 
done little to combat the marginalization and systemic racism of Guatemala’s 
indigenous population (Booth, et al, 2006). Although Guatemala’s new leader has done 
much to improve the country’s societal and economic woes, there is still a long road 
ahead to peace. 
With the peace accords came the end of Guatemala’s long and brutal civil war. 
However, economically, Guatemala still faces an uphill battle.  There continues to be 
widespread political violence and corruption of business and government, which has 
continually discouraged investors. Distribution of income remains grossly unequal, 
resulting in a poverty-stricken lower class and a small but increasing wealthy upper 
class (The World Factbook, 2006).  Other issues that need to be addressed include 
decreasing the country’s trade deficit, receiving monetary assistance from international 
sources, increasing government revenues and upgrading financial operations for both 
government and financial operations. 
Project Globe (2004) illustrates an interesting perspective, which assesses a 
society's level of future orientation (House, et. al. 2004). In this scenario, cultural future 
orientation refers to "the degree to which a collectivity encourages and rewards future-
orientated behaviors such as planning and delaying gratification." The present and 
future success of a country is effectively described by this measure. A society's level of 
future orientation is portrayed using two constructs. Orientation practices, the first 
construct, depicts the extent to which a society actually engages in future orientation 
practices. The extent to which a society should engage in future orientation practices is 
assessed by the second construct, orientation values4. Guatemala earned a score of 3.24 
on orientation practices, and a score of 5.91 on orientation values on a scale from 1 to 7. 
These data suggest that a negative correlation exists between practices and values, 
thereby concluding that Future Orientation societies reporting weaker practices have 
stronger aspirations for Future Orientation. It may be that societies lacking Future 
Orientation practices suffer most from the uncertainty and unpredictability of not 
addressing the longer-term fundamental issues (House, 2004). Therefore, societies are 
most conscious of the need for moving toward a more strategic and spiritually fulfilling 
                                                 
3 Berger pledged to reduce the size of the military by thirty-five percent and the budget, fixed at 0.33 
percent of GDP based on the CEH report (Latin America Database, 1999). 
4 Higher scores represent greater future orientation. 
 
perspective.  These relationships and how they effect inidivadual countries are depicted 
in Table 1. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
House (2004) offers a perspective on the characteristics of societies with low 
scores on future orientation.  
Societies that score lower on future orientation tend to have lower levels of 
economic success; a propensity to spend now, rather than save for the future; 
have individuals who are less intrinsically motivated; have organizations with 
shorter strategic orientation; value instant gratification and place higher 
priorities on immediate rewards, and emphasize leadership that focuses on 
repetition of reproducible and routine sequences (p. 217).  
 
Although Guatemala currently has a low practices score and displays many of 
the characteristics listed above, it is also aware that it needs to engage in more future 
orientation practices. This research illustrates the effects of a long history of corruption 
and weak corporate governance. The fact that Guatemala has had such a tempestuous 
and unstable government makes the country a perfect example of a society that needs 
to, and desires to, improve leadership and ultimately the economy as a whole. 
A country's history, value system, and cultural norms can affect how business is 
perceived and conducted. These factors are less likely to be subject to precise 
measurements, but can still be significant forces when it comes to business transactions. 
A particular cultural issue, according to Dallas (2004a), that is important in corporate 
governance, is the prioritization of stakeholder interests. The ongoing development of 
environmental and social reporting, and the related agenda for greater attention to issues 
of corporate sustainable development, may lead to further differentiation from country 
to country based on the relative priorities given to non-financial stakeholder interests. 
Additionally, no company is completely shielded from its economic or political 
environment, particularly in the case of countries with troubled or developing 
economies, such as Guatemala. These factors can distract directors and managers from a 
governance focus on developing sustainable stakeholder values. In the setting of 
regulatory and disclosure standards, political or state influences can be very significant 
(S&P, 2002). Therefore, if a country has a highly corrupt political environment, the 
standards from which it conducts business will likely be corrupt as well. 
II: Transparency and Corruption 
It is clear from examining the political and cultural environment that poverty 
and corruption continue to be problematic within the Guatemalan society. This 
statement is reinforced by the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), which states that 
there is a strong correlation between poverty and corruption, with a concentration of 
impoverished states at the bottom of the ranking. The CPI focuses on corruption in the 
public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. In an 
effort to determine public opinion on both administrative and political corruption, 
questions used in the surveys address the misuse of public power for private benefit, as 
well as the strength of anti-corruption policies (CPI, 2006).  
Researchers have found difficulties in comparing levels of corruption from 
country to country by using hard empirical data.  By comparing data such as amount of 
bribes or prosecutions against corruption, one does not see the full impact or depth of 
 
corruption, only how much that corruption has been exposed either through media or 
court cases.  A stronger method is therefore to obtain the opinions and experiences of 
those citizens who deal directly or are confronted with corruption (Transparency 
International, 2006).  
There are two aspects to the index, the CPI score and the confidence range. The 
CPI score, which ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean), is calculated 
using the perceptions of business people and country analysts as it relates to corruption 
in their countries. The conditions in Guatemala warrant a CPI score of 2.6, which as 
mentioned earlier, means corruption in that country is considered rampant. The 
confidence range describes how a particular score might vary based on various factors 
and precision, and provides a range of possible values of the score5.  These relationships 
are depicted in Table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Transparency International’s 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index upgraded 
Guatemala to position 117 from 122 out of 158 countries (1 being the most transparent). 
Within Latin American countries, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Haiti are ranked lower. 
Still, significantly more improvements must be made if the country wants to take 
advantage of investment opportunities available to it through the Dominican Republic-
Central America Free Trade Agreement (DRCAFTA). A ranking of corruption across 
the globe has been developed annually by Transparency International (Corruption 
Perceptions Index, 2006) and is included for 2006 as table 3. Within Central America, 
Guatemala will compete for these investments with Costa Rica and El Salvador, two 
nations with similar economies to Guatemala6, among others.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Cazurra (2006) provides insight as to the impact of corruption on foreign direct 
investment. His position on how corruption affects investments is that it causes 
confusion on a country’s actual operation costs, acting as an irregular tax on businesses, 
increasing costs and discouraging investors. Further, his study also shows that 
corruption within a country results in relatively higher investment from countries with 
high levels of corruption. In this sense investors who have been exposed to bribery at 
home may not be deterred by corruption abroad, but instead seek countries where 
corruption is prevalent (Cazurra, 2006). Hence, one would assume the corruption in 
Guatemala attracts corrupt investors, further escalating the ongoing problem. 
Guatemala is currently taking steps in the right direction. One of the pillars in 
which Guatemala's Ministry of Finances has taken a fundamental interest is 
transparency. Fiscal Transparency, an area within the Ministry, was created in order to 
strengthen transparency in governmental management (Ministry of Finance, 2006). 
Transparency involves the timely disclosure of adequate information concerning 
a company's operating and financial performance and its corporate governance 
practices. For a well-governed company, standards of timely disclosure and 
transparency are high. This enables shareholders, creditors and directors to effectively 
monitor the actions of management and the operating and financial performance of the 
                                                 
5 Nominally, with 5 percent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 percent it is 
below. However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean 
coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%. 
6 It is important to note that Costa Rica has a CPI of 55 and El Salvador has a CPI of 57. 
 
company. Strong transparency means that the financial reporting facilitates a clear 
understanding of a company's true underlying financial condition. In part, this means 
that contingent liabilities and non-arm's length relationships with other related 
companies are disclosed (S&P, 2002).  
Vankin (2003) states that the functions of the Chief Financial Officer are: 
to regulate, supervise and implement a timely, full and accurate set of 
accounting books of the firm reflecting all its activities in a manner 
commensurate with the relevant legislation and regulation in the territories of 
operation of the firm and subject to internal guidelines set from time to time by 
the Board of Directors of the firm (p. 2). 
 
Well governed corporations willing to invest are often deterred even by the hint 
of government corruption. This can be somewhat difficult in developing countries such 
as Guatemala. Because the company’s accounting process in this environment is 
generally structured to only disclose limited resources to a corrupt government, they do 
not reflect reality. Therefore, two sets of books are maintained. One is the accurate set, 
which incorporates all the income, and another set that is presented to the tax 
authorities. The CFO is thereby given excessive power. He is in a position to blackmail 
the management and the shareholders of the firm, he becomes the information junction 
of the firm, and if he is dishonest, he can easily enrich himself (Vankin, 2003). Further, 
American corporations wishing to invest or partner with Guatemalan businesses are 
now at risk of investigation by both the Department of Justice and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission for violations of both the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Stoltz & Michelman, 2006; 2007). 
Standard & Poor's Corporate Governance Score document states that in 
countries such as this, a commitment to transparency may mean that the company 
adopts internationally recognized accounting principles in addition to local accounting 
standards. Furthermore, transparency imposes an open policy regarding non-financial 
performance, particularly relating to a company's business operations and competitive 
position (Transparency International, 2006). Promoting high standards of transparency 
involves publicly disclosing the corporate charter, by-laws, and clearly articulating the 
corporate mission. From a board perspective, it is important to have a clear disclosure 
policy of who the company directors are, the basis of their compensation and the extent 
to which they are independent or insiders (S&P, 2002). 
III: Corporate Governance in Guatemala 
Transparency is so critical to the status of a country's economic and political 
environment, that it is one of the four core principles of corporate governance practices 
included in Standard & Poor's corporate governance model, along with fairness, 
accountability, and responsibility. Although there is no one model of corporate 
governance that works in all countries and all companies, these are standards that can 
apply across a broad range of legal, political, and economic environments (S&P, 2002).  
This methodology is the approach taken by Standard & Poor's in order to 
analyze corporate governance at both a country and company level. Corporate 
governance standards are receiving greater attention in both developed and developing 
countries as a result of the increasing recognition that a firm's corporate governance 
 
affects both its economic performance and its ability to access long-term, low-cost 
investment capital (Dallas, 2004b). 
According to Standard & Poor's, governance standards practiced by individual 
companies may reflect compliance with externally imposed governance standards. In 
countries where the external environment is weak, as in Guatemala, these individual 
company practices may also reflect the extent to which internal company governance 
discipline may or may not offset the weaker external infrastructure (S&P, 2002).  
Mesquita (2004) explores the country governance environments in three broad 
groupings: Anglo-American, Continental European/Japan, and Emerging/Transition 
Economies, using a framework that describes the macro forces that shape the corporate 
governance environment in individual countries. These forces are placed in the 
categories of market infrastructure, legal infrastructure, regulatory infrastructure, and 
informational infrastructure. 
In this research, we focus on the emerging or transition economies, as they are 
most representative of Guatemala. These countries are still relatively poor on a GDP per 
capital basis and, in many cases, are still developing strong market infrastructures. Due 
to either the quality of law or its enforcement, the effectiveness of the legal and 
regulatory environment in these economies can be quite limited. It is customary to have 
concentrated ownership, and the state still can play a significant role in individual 
company governance, particularly in transitional or socialist economies (Mesquita, 
2004). 
Country factors can play important, and in some cases determining, roles in 
setting the environment for corporate governance practice at the individual company 
level. Attitudes toward corporate governance can vary notably from country to country. 
Diverse country forces, such as legal, political, historical, and cultural, come together to 
shape ownership structures, stakeholder priorities, and fundamental attitudes toward the 
role of the firm in the economy. These, in turn, influence the structures and rules that 
guide both the culture and practice of corporate governance in individual firms (S&P, 
2002). 
The country environment, in particular, can manipulate the expression and 
practical protection of ownership rights, the norms of transparency and disclosure, as 
well as the tradition of strong, independent board oversight (Bradley, 2004). However, a 
positive country governance environment does not ensure that all companies in a given 
country will demonstrate strong corporate governance standards. At the same time, it is 
generally possible for companies in weak country environments to adopt governance 
standards that rise above local practice. 
In Guatemala's state of an emerging economy, the primary corporate governance 
problems consist of a lack of effective definition and enforcement of ownership rights, 
strong block holder influences, influences of the state that detract from shareholder 
value, limited capital market liquidity, and weak internal controls. In addition, they tend 
to have poorly enforced accounting standards, weak board effectiveness, and a lack of 
independent directors (S&P, 2002).  
While Standard & Poor's does not currently score individual countries, a 
country's legal, regulatory and market environment is reflected upon, and is an 
important element in the overall analysis of the risks associated with the governance 
practices of an individual company. In the future, Standard & Poor's plans to develop a 
 
more formal country governance analysis, which will enable Standard & Poor's to 
assign a "country governance classification," that represents how effective the legal, 
regulatory informational and market infrastructure is. This will tell how external forces 
at a macro level can influence the quality of a company's corporate governance (S&P, 
2002; Dallas, 2004a).  
In the meantime, a partition of Standard & Poor's, called the Sovereign Ratings 
Group, offers the "Sovereign Ratings in Latin America," which presents a summary of 
Standard & Poor's credit analysis of sovereign nations in the Western Hemisphere. The 
articles in this book provide details on trends in individual countries and indicate the 
main strengths and vulnerabilities for each rating. 
The ratings on the Republic of Guatemala are supported by a variety of facts and 
statistics gathered by the Sovereign Ratings Group, such as Guatemala's long track 
record of conservative fiscal policies and improvement of transparency on governance 
and public institutions. Additionally, the ratings have been influenced by on-going 
progress toward political pluralism that has increased the role for the Guatemalan 
congress in making policy, as well as diminished gross external financing requirements 
that have been supported by a large flow of family payments and a strong international 
reserves position. Finally, economic prospects have improved as a result of the DR-
CAFTA.  
On the other hand, the ratings are constrained by very limited fiscal flexibility 
due to the inability to increase tax revenue; poverty and a highly skewed income 
distribution, which continue to constrain economic and social development; and the 
persistence of external imbalances (Sovereign, 2006).  
Since taking office in 2004, the Administration of President Oscar Berger has 
implemented a series of difficult policies and drastic actions to improve fiscal 
administration, reduce tax evasion, and eradicate corruption. The “Anti Evasion” Law, 
passed by Congress in late May 2006, aspires to narrow or close loopholes in the 
current tax legislation and gives the tax administration office (Superintendencia de 
Administracion Tributartia [SAT]) the tools to reduce and prosecute tax evasion. 
Simultaneously, the Guatemalan congress finally passed the legislation needed to 
implement DR-CAFTA, and the agreement has been operating since July 1, 2006. 
These two pieces of legislation were the result of an intense and time-consuming debate 
in Congress. The progress in both is an unmistakable sign of the growing ability of the 
political class, across all parties, to negotiate and achieve an agreement on key 
economic policies. In addition, the Berger government continued its tight fiscal policy 
even after Hurricane Stan hit Guatemala in the second half of 20057 (Booth, 2006). 
The outlook on Guatemala reflects Standard & Poor’s expectation that economic 
policy will continue on a stable path after the 2007 presidential election. At the same 
time, recent steps to strengthen the tax administration and improved economic growth 
should lead to rising fiscal revenue and help sustain modest fiscal deficits in the coming 
years. Further steps to improve transparency and political cohesion, along with 
increases in the tax base, should increase creditworthiness. On the other hand, fiscal 
mistakes and a return to political divergence that limits the government’s capability to 
                                                 
7 The general government deficit (including losses from Banco de Guatemala) was about 2% of GDP in 
2005, slightly above expectations but still in line with the government’s public investment program and 
its policy of keeping the fiscal deficit at a maximum of 2% of GDP (S&P, 2002). 
 
apply effective economic policies might pressure the ratings to decrease (Sovereign, 
2006). 
IV: Conclusions 
In Guatemala, the institutional framework is improving, as shown by a 
comparative analysis within Sovereign, but there is still a long way to go. Additionally, 
a low ratio of GDP to tax revenues as compared to peers will keep inhibiting the 
government’s ability to significantly improve social standards. Debt levels are positive 
compared with those of its peers, both as apercent of GDP and as a percent of 
government revenue. In contrast, Guatemala’s social indicators are among the weakest 
of all sovereign nations rated by Standard & Poor’s. The Berger Administration has 
given emphasis to compliance with the 1996 peace agreements since taking office in 
2004, which set a bold agenda for social and economic development, and focused on 
eliminating corruption in Guatemala.  
Evaluating Guatemala through means of the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index, Standard & Poor's Corporate Governance ratings, and 
Standard & Poor's Sovereign Ratings in Latin American, we can develop a greater 
understanding of where the country stands in terms of corruption, transparency, and 
corporate governance. These three criteria have a tremendous impact on foreign  
investors’ willingness to invest in and operate in Guatemala. If the United States were 
to consider business transactions with a country in such an economic position as 
Guatemala, it must face the realization that in doing so, it would be very difficult to 
comply with the regulations set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley. The fact that businesses in 
Guatemala routinely engage in bribery with local officials and are known to keep two 
sets of accounting records, it certainly discourages investment from countries that must 
operate within strict regulations, such as those in Sarbanes-Oxley and the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act. 
Therefore, before Guatemala can expect its economy to grow and succeed, the 
level of corporate governance must improve whereby other prosperous countries are 
encouraged to invest and operate within the country. If the country continues to do 
business with corrupt nations, it will never escape from the vicious cycle of corruption 
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Country Score Country Score Country Score Country Score
Singapore 5.07        Sweden 4.39        El Salvador 3.80        Poland 3.11        
Switzerland 4.73        Japan 4.29        Qatar 3.78        Argentina 3.08        
South Africaa 4.64        England 4.28        Zimbabwe 3.77        Russia 2.88        
Netherlands 4.61        French-speaking China 3.75        
Malaysia 4.58           Switzerland 4.27        Turkey 3.74        
Austria 4.46        Germanyc 4.27        Ecuador 3.74        
Denmark 4.44        Finland 4.24        Portugal 3.71        
Canadab 4.44        India 4.19        Iran 3.70        
Philippines 4.15        Zambia 3.62        
U.S. 4.15        Bolivia 3.61        
South Africad 4.13        Costa Rica 3.60        
Nigeria 4.09        Slovenia 3.59        
Australia 4.09        Kazakhstan 3.57        
Hong Kong 4.03        Spain 3.51        
Ireland 3.98        Namibia 3.49        
South Korea 3.97        France 3.48        
Taiwan 3.96        New Zealand 3.47        
Germanye 3.95        Thailand 3.43        
Mexico 3.87        Georgia 3.41        
Egypt 3.86        Greece 3.40        
Indonesia 3.86        Venezuela 3.35        
Albania 3.86        Colombia 3.27        
Israel 3.85        Kuwait 3.26        
Brazil 3.81        Morocco 3.26        
Italy 3.25        
Guatemala 3.24      
Hungary 3.21        
(House, 2004, 304-306)
a South Africa (Black Sample)
b Canada (English-speaking)
c Germany (West): Former FRG
d South Africa (White Sample)
e Germany (East): Former GDR
Table 1: Future Orientation: Society Practices
Band





















Country Score Country Score Country Score Country Score
Thailand 6.20        Colombia 5.68        Australia 5.15        Denmark 4.33        
Namibia 6.12        South Africaa 5.66        Austria 5.11        
Zimbabwe 6.07        Bolivia 5.63        Finland 5.07        
Nigeria 6.04        Spain 5.63        Netherlands 5.07        
El Salvador 5.98        India 5.60        England 5.06        
Ecuador 5.94        Georgia 5.55        Kazakhstan 5.05        
Philippines 5.93        New Zealand 5.54        France 4.96        
Qatar 5.92        Singapore 5.51        Sweden 4.89        
Italy 5.91        Hong Kong 5.50        Germanye 4.85        
Guatemala 5.91        Russia 5.48        French-speaking
Zambia 5.90        Portugal 5.43          Switzerland 4.80        
Malaysia 5.89        Slovenia 5.42        Switzerland 4.79        
Mexico 5.86        Albania 5.42        China 4.73        
Morocco 5.85        Canadab 5.35        
Iran 5.84        U.S. 5.31        
Turkey 5.83        Japan 5.25        
Egypt 5.80        Israel 5.25        
Venezuela 5.79        Germanyc 5.23        
Argentina 5.78        Ireland 5.22        
Kuwait 5.74        Poland 5.20        
Indonesia 5.70        Costa Rica 5.20        
Hungary 5.70        Taiwan 5.20        
South Korea 5.69        South Africad 5.20        
Brazil 5.69        Greece 5.19        
(House, 2004, 304-306)
a South Africa (Black Sample)
b Canada (English-speaking)
c Germany (West): Former FRG
d South Africa (White Sample)
e Germany (East): Former GDR
Table 2: Future Orientation: Society Values
Band













Table 3: Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2006 





Score Confidence Range 
Surveys 
Used 
1 Finland 9.6 9.4 - 9.7 7 
 
Iceland 9.6 9.5 - 9.7 6 
New Zealand 9.6 9.4 - 9.6 7 
4 Denmark 9.5 9.4 - 9.6 7 
5 Singapore 9.4 9.2 - 9.5 9 
6 Sweden 9.2 9.0 - 9.3 7 
7 Switzerland 9.1 8.9 - 9.2 7 
8 Norway 8.8 8.4 - 9.1 7 
9 Australia 8.7 8.3 - 9.0 8 
Netherlands 8.7 8.3 - 9.0 7 
11 Austria 8.6 8.2 - 8.9 7 
Luxembourg 8.6 8.1 - 9.0 6 
United Kingdom 8.6 8.2 - 8.9 7 
14 Canada 8.5 8.0 - 8.9 7 
15 Hong Kong 8.3 7.7 - 8.8 9 
16 Germany 8.0 7.8 - 8.4 7 
17 Japan 7.6 7.0 - 8.1 9 
18 France 7.4 6.7 - 7.8 7 
Ireland 7.4 6.7 - 7.9 7 
20 Belgium 7.3 6.6 - 7.9 7 
Chile 7.3 6.6 - 7.6 7 
USA 7.3 6.6 - 7.8 8 
23 Spain 6.8 6.3 - 7.2 7 
24 Barbados 6.7 6.0 - 7.2 4 
Estonia 6.7 6.1 - 7.4 8 
26 Macao 6.6 5.4 - 7.1 3 
Portugal 6.6 5.9 - 7.3 7 
28 Malta 6.4 5.4 - 7.3 4 
Slovenia 6.4 5.7 - 7.0 8 
Uruguay 6.4 5.9 - 7.0 5 
31 United Arab Emirates 6.2 5.6 - 6.9 5 
32 Bhutan 6.0 4.1 - 7.3 3 
Qatar 6.0 5.6 - 6.5 5 
34 Israel 5.9 5.2 - 6.5 7 
Taiwan 5.9 5.6 - 6.2 9 
36 Bahrain 5.7 5.3 - 6.2 5 
37 Botswana 5.6 4.8 - 6.6 6 
Cyprus 5.6 5.2 - 5.9 4 
39 Oman 5.4 4.1 - 6.2 3 
40 Jordan 5.3 4.5 - 5.7 7 
41 Hungary 5.2 5.0 - 5.4 8 
42 Mauritius 5.1 4.1 - 6.3 5 







Score Confidence Range 
Surveys 
Used
45 Italy 4.9 4.4. - 5.4 7 
46 Czech Republic 4.8 4.4 - 5.2 8 
Kuwait 4.8 4.0 - 5.4 5 
Lithuania 4.8 4.2 - 5.6 6 
49 Latvia 4.7 4.0 - 5.5 6 
Slovakia 4.7 4.3 - 5.2 8 
51 South Africa 4.6 4.1 - 5.1 8 
Tunisia 4.6 3.9 - 5.6 5 
53 Dominica 4.5 3.5 - 5.3 3 
54 Greece 4.4 3.9 - 5.0 7 
55 Costa Rica 4.1 3.3 - 4.8 5 
Namibia 4.1 3.6 - 4.9 6 
57 Bulgaria 4.0 3.4 - 4.8 7 
El Salvador 4.0 3.2 - 4.8 5 
59 Colombia 3.9 3.5 - 4.7 7 
60 Turkey 3.8 3.3. - 4.2 7 
61 Jamaica 3.7 3.4 - 4.0 5 
Poland 3.7 3.2 - 4.4 8 
63 Lebanon 3.6 3.2 - 3.8 3 
Seychelles 3.6 3.2 - 3.8 3 
Thailand 3.6 3.2 - 3.9 9 
66 Belize 3.5 2.3 - 4.0 3 
Cuba 3.5 1.8 - 4.7 3 
Grenada 3.5 2.3 - 4.1 3 
69 Croatia 3.4 3.1 - 3.7 7 
70 Brazil 3.3 3.1 - 3.6 7 
China 3.3 3.0 - 3.6 9 
Egypt 3.3 3.0 - 3.7 6 
Ghana 3.3 3.0 - 3.6 6 
India 3.3 3.1 - 3.6 10 
Mexico 3.3 3.1 - 3.4 7 
Peru 3.3 2.8 - 3.8 5 
Saudi Arabia 3.3 2.2 - 3.7 3 
Senegal 3.3 2.8 - 3.7 5 
79 Burkina Faso 3.2 2.8 - 3.6 5 
Lesotho 3.2 2.9 - 3.6 5 
Moldova 3.2 2.7 - 3.8 7 
Morocco 3.2 2.8 - 3.5 6 
Trinidad and Tobago 3.2 2.8 - 3.6 5 
84 Algeria 3.1 2.7 - 3.6 5 
Madagascar 3.1 2.3 - 3.7 5 
 
Mauritania 3.1 2.1 - 3.7 4 
Panama 3.1 2.8 - 3.3 5 
Romania 3.1 3.0 - 3.2 8 






Score Confidence Range 
Surveys 
Used 
90 Gabon 3.0 2.4 - 3.3 4 
 
Serbia 3.0 2.7 - 3.3 7 
Suriname 3.0 2.7 - 3.3 4 
93 Argentina 2.9 2.7 - 3.2 7 
Armenia 2.9 2.7 - 3.0 6 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.9 2.7 - 3.1 6 
Eritrea 2.9 2.2 - 3.5 3 
Syria 2.9 2.3 - 3.2 3 
Tanzania 2.9 2.7 - 3.1 7 
99 Dominican Republic 2.8 2.4 - 3.2 5 
Georgia 2.8 2.5 - 3.0 6 
Mali 2.8 2.5 - 3.3 7 
Mongolia 2.8 2.3 - 3.4 5 
Mozambique 2.8 2.5 - 3.0 7 
Ukraine 2.8 2.5 - 3.0 6 
105 Bolivia 2.7 2.4 - 3.0 6 
Iran 2.7 2.3 - 3.1 3 
Libya 2.7 2.4 - 3.2 3 
Macedonia 2.7 2.6 - 2.9 6 
Malawi 2.7 2.5 - 3.0 7 
Uganda 2.7 2.4 - 3.0 7 
111 Albania 2.6 2.4 - 2.7 5 
Guatemala 2.6 2.3 - 3.0 5 
Kazakhstan 2.6 2.3 - 2.8 6 
Laos 2.6 2.0 - 3.1 4 
Nicaragua 2.6 2.4 - 2.9 6 
Paraguay 2.6 2.2 - 3.3 5 
Timor-Leste 2.6 2.3 - 3.0 3 
Vietnam 2.6 2.4 - 2.9 8 
Yemen 2.6 2.4 - 2.7 4 
Zambia 2.6 2.1 - 3.0 6 
121 Benin 2.5 2.1 - 2.9 6 
Gambia 2.5 2.3 - 2.8 6 
Guyana 2.5 2.2 - 2.6 5 
Honduras 2.5 2.4 - 2.7 6 
Nepal 2.5 2.3 - 2.9 5 
Philippines 2.5 2.3 - 2.8 9 
 
Russia 2.5 2.3 - 2.7 8 
Rwanda 2.5 2.3 - 2.6 3 
Swaziland 2.5 2.2 - 2.7 3 
130 Azerbaijan 2.4 2.2 - 2.6 7 
Burundi 2.4 2.2 - 2.6 5 











Ethiopia 2.4 2.2 - 2.6 7 
Indonesia 2.4 2.2 - 2.6 10 
Papua New Guinea 2.4 2.3 - 2.6 4 
Togo 2.4 1.9 - 2.6 3 
Zimbabwe 2.4 2.0 - 2.8 7 
138 Cameroon 2.3 2.1 - 2.5 7 
Ecuador 2.3 2.2 - 2.5 5 
Niger 2.3 2.1 - 2.6 5 
Venezuela 2.3 2.2 - 2.4 7 
142 Angola 2.2 1.9 - 2.4 5 
Congo Republic 2.2 2.2 - 2.3 4 
Kenya 2.2 2.0 - 2.4 7 
Kyrgyzstan 2.2 2.0 - 2.6 6 
Nigeria 2.2 2.0 - 2.3 7 
Pakistan 2.2 2.0 - 2.4 6 
Sierra Leone 2.2 2.2 - 2.3 3 
Tajikistan 2.2 2.0 - 2.4 6 
Turkmenistan 2.2 1.9 - 2.5 4 
151 Belarus 2.1 1.9 - 2.2 4 
Cambodia 2.1 1.9 - 2.4 6 
Côte d'Ivoire 2.1 2.0 - 2.2 4 
Equatorial Guinea 2.1 1.7 - 2.2 3 
Uzbekistan 2.1 1.8 - 2.2 5 
156 Bangladesh 2.0 1.7 - 2.2 6 
Chad 2.0 1.8 - 2.3 6 
Congo, Democratic 
Republic 2.0 1.8 - 2.2 4 
Sudan 2.0 1.8 - 2.2 4 
160 Guinea 1.9 1.7 - 2.1 3 
Iraq 1.9 1.6 - 2.1 3 
Myanmar 1.9 1.8 - 2.3 3 
163 Haiti 1.8 1.7 - 1.8 3 
   
 
(Corruption Perceptions Index 2006, 5-7) 
 
 
